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ABSTRACT. This paper considers whether publicizing criminal labels is justified as
a form of punishment. It begins by arguing that making criminal labels public is
inevitably stigmatizing and that stigmatization is not, as is often implied, a defining
aspect of censure, but needs independent justification. It argues that justifying
grounds for public criminal labelling cannot be found in either the communicative
account of punishment or deterrence theory. Rather, public criminal labelling
should be understood as undermining of both the communicative and the
deterrent functions of punishment. Recent empirical work is drawn upon to
support the claims about public criminal labelling and deterrence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Being implicated in criminal behaviour is often followed by some
form of public criminal labelling. Criminal records, sex offender and
domestic violence registers, conspicuous clothing for offenders car-
rying out community sentences, are all examples of criminal labels,
understood here as officially recorded expressions of judgements
about the criminality of an individual. The visibility of criminal labels
varies widely both within and between jurisdictions. For example, in
a number of European countries, state authorities conceal the
identity of those charged and convicted with crimes, though some
public interest exceptions apply.1 In contrast, in the USA state
authorities broadcast, via publicly searchable databases on the
Internet, the identities of people convicted, charged, or even merely
arrested in connection with crimes.2 In the UK, some offenders
serving community service sentences are compelled to wear high-
1 Jacobs and Larrauri, ‘Are criminal convictions a public matter? The USA and Spain’ Punishment and
Society, 14(1), 2012.
2 Ibid.
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visibility orange vests while they work, thereby alerting their status
to members of the public,3 and some preventive criminal designa-
tions, such as Anti Social Behaviour Orders (‘ASBOs’) and prevention
orders, are routinely publicised by police on posters and in local
media, even when they pertain to children. At the same time,
however, in most countries the identities of minors charged or
convicted with crimes are concealed until they reach the age of
eighteen. As this diversity suggests, at least on the face of things no
single rationale for applying and publicising criminal labels can ex-
plain current practice.
When is a state justified in attaching a criminal label to someone
and what kind of publicity should that label be given? Recent critical
discussions of criminal labelling practices largely ignore questions
regarding the proper scope and nature of the publicity given to
criminal labels. They focus instead on the necessary and sufficient
conditions for applying such labels in the first place. In particular,
they seem preoccupied with the question of whether labelling can
ever be justified for those whose criminal guilt has not been legally
proven. The reason most often put forward for this preoccupation is
that labelling people as criminals stigmatises them as such. Criminal
stigmatisation, it is argued, is a burden, which should only be suf-
fered by those whose criminal guilt has been proven to a sufficiently
high standard.4
It is sometimes claimed, but more often an underlying assump-
tion of these discussions, that public labelling in response to proven
criminal guilt – e.g. of criminal convictions – is permitted, at least in
part, because people who commit crimes deserve to be labelled
publicly as criminals.5 Public criminal labelling is thus implicitly
conceptualised as a legitimate form of, or aspect of punishment, even
when it is not defined as such in substantive criminal law. And it is
taken as given that labelling should, like any other kind of de facto
punishment, be reserved for the legally guilty; practices that attach
criminal labels to those not proven guilty of crimes are thought to
risk punishing the innocent and thus undermining or violating the
3 See UK government webpage ‘Community Service’: https://www.gov.uk/community-sentences/
community-payback.
4 Campbell, L. ‘Criminal labels, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the presumption
of innocence’, Modern Law Review, 76(4), 2013. Stanton-Ife ‘Strict Liability: Stigma and Regret’’ Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies, 27(1), 2007.
5 Stanton-Ife (2007, p. 153).
KATERINA HADJIMATHEOU
presumption of innocence.6 For this reason, public criminal labelling
is seen as unproblematic in principle for convicted offenders, but as
prima facie suspect for those subject to preventive measures such as
ASBOs.
This account of the conditions for just criminal labelling is
problematic, for at least two reasons. The first relates to its
assumption that questions about the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for justified criminal labelling can be answered without
consideration of the publicity given to such labels. I share – and in
this paper put forward arguments in support of – the view that
criminal labelling is in practice stigmatising and that stigma is a
burden that needs justification. But it seems to me that the extent to
which criminal stigmatisation of a specific individual occurs depends,
at least in part, on the extent to which the criminal label attached to
them is visible to others. In other words, publicity is not a necessary
feature of criminal labelling, but it is a necessary condition of
criminal stigmatisation. So we have to first justify the legitimacy of
public criminal labelling as a form of punishment, before we can
conclude that it should only be applied to the guilty. But – and here
we come to the second problem, which is also the main focus of this
paper – I am sceptical that a justification for public labelling can in
fact be found in the need to punish. And if public labelling is not
justified as punishment, then questions about when it is justified are
less easy to resolve by reference to the existence of legal proof of
guilt than some legal theorists suppose.
In what follows, I sketch out and then highlight difficulties with
two defences of public criminal labelling as punishment: the com-
municative defence and the deterrence defence. The communicative
account of punishment is one of the most influential in scholarly
circles today and can offer probably the most convincing defence of
public labelling. Deterrence continues to be the criminal justice aim
most frequently cited by police and policy makers in defence of
criminal labelling practices. Neither the communicative nor the
6 Ball, D.W. ‘The civil case at the heart of criminal procedure: in re Winship, stigma and the civil-
criminal distinction’, American Journal of Criminal Law 38(2), 2011. Also Campbell, who argues that the
presumption of innocence can be interpreted ‘as conveying to the citizenry that an individual may be
depicted and censured openly as criminal only with proof to the requisite level.’ As I note later, this
merely begs the question of whether punishment requires publicity of criminal labels or not. See
Campbell (2013, p. 690).
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deterrence case for public labelling of criminals has as yet been
subject to systematic critical scrutiny.
Though recent years have seen an increase in the prevalence of
the public naming-and-shaming of perceived wrongdoers, in partic-
ular online, and though the justice of shaming sanctions is a live
debate amongst moral and legal theorists,7 I do not consider in this
paper whether public labelling is justified in virtue of the shame it
induces in criminals. This is partly because shaming sanctions are
often justified in virtue of their deterrence value, which is already
addressed below, and partly because I agree with those scholars who
find it difficult to accept that suffering for suffering’s sake can be a
legitimate aim of criminal punishment.
Neither do I consider here whether making criminal labels public
might be justified for non-punitive reasons. Rather, I leave open the
question whether publicity might be justified by appeal to the need
for transparency and openness in criminal justice; the right of people
to know about the criminality of others; the need to reduce the risk
posed by ex-offenders to the public; or the potential reassurance
publicity might offer the public, amongst other things. These non-
punitive justifications certainly deserve sustained consideration. I
think such consideration will be easier to achieve once we are clearer
about whether publicity serves what is arguably the fundamental
function of criminal justice, namely to punish the guilty.
However, the arguments put forward here are relevant to consid-
erations of whether publicity of criminal labels is justified as a by-
product – or ‘collateral consequence’ – of punishment. First, they
suggest that punishment does not require publicity of labels, and
therefore that public labelling is not a necessary by-product of pun-
ishment. Second, they claim that the harms of public labelling raise
issues of fairness and proportionality; as has been argued extensively in
the context of debates about war, fairness and proportionality con-
siderations apply not only to actions and policies but also to the by-
products thereof.8 These arguments are relevant to government actors
– typically policy-makers and legislators – responsible for devising
7 Nussbaum, Martha, Hiding from Humanity: Shame, Disgust and the Law. Princeton University Press,
2004; Kahan DM, ‘What’s really wrong with shaming sanctions’ Texas Law Review 84(7), 2006: 2075–
2097; Arneson, R. ‘Shame stigma and disgust in the decent society’, Journal of Ethics, 11(1) 2007: 31–63.
8 For a seminal discussion of this issue in the context of just war theory see Walzer, Michael, Just and
Unjust Wars, New York: Basic Books 1997, pp. 151–159.
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punishments and thus for deciding whether and to what extent they
will include an element of public labelling. They are also relevant to
members of the judiciary when and to the extent that they have the
discretion to choose between the infliction of punishments involving
labelling and punishments that do not. With respect to much current
practice in the UK, including the imposition of ASBOs and community
service uniforms, such discretion is not afforded to judges; more dis-
cretion is afforded to judges in some US states.
The paper is structured as follows. I begin by arguing that stig-
matisation and the public labelling that triggers it are not essential to
punishment, as some theorists imply, but rather must be defended
by appeal to their contribution to one or more of the justifying
functions of punishment. I then consider the communicative and the
deterrence functions in turn. First, I argue that the communicative
justification fails because it delegates the right to punish to individual
citizens. At best, this places unrealistic and unreasonable demands on
individuals to punish. At worst, it leads to disproportionality in
punishment. I argue that the disproportionality it leads to is more
difficult to justify than the disproportionality that currently results
from standardised punishments like incarceration, because it is the
product of unfairness and discrimination towards those labelled.
Finally, against the deterrence-based justification for public labelling,
I draw on recent empirical work in labelling theory to argue that
labelling aggravates recidivism and thus fails to deter the group most
likely to commit crime, namely ex-offenders.
II. UNTANGLING CRIMINAL LABELLING, STIGMATISATION, AND
CENSURE
Before examining the communicative and deterrence potential of
public labelling, I want to consider the claim that stigmatisation is a
defining feature of criminal punishment, because this claim implies
that, irrespective of the specific theory of punishment one subscribes
to, wherever punishment is the appropriate reaction to an act, so is
criminal stigmatisation. If this is correct, then the fact that labelling
someone as criminal stigmatises them is by itself no reason not to
label them, if it is morally legitimate to punish them. I argue that this
view mistakenly conflates censure, which is indeed a defining feature
of punishment, with criminal stigmatisation, which is not. If I am
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correct, then the fact that punishment is the correct response to an
act is not sufficient reason to publicly label and thus stigmatise
someone as criminal.
Stigmatisation involves the process of marking someone out in
some visible and identifiable way as having a characteristic that is
deeply discrediting.9 The more visible and identifying the mark, the
more it dominates other facts about the person, and the more dis-
crediting it is, the more stigmatizing it is.10 Most acts of marking out
that are stigmatizing are in fact motivated by negative reactions (like
public disapproval of crime) to some actual or perceived quality of
the individual, but negative motivations are not a necessary feature
of stigmatization: an act of marking out may be intended to honour
but may in practice have the effect of degrading. In contrast, nega-
tive reactions to a mark are necessary for stigmatization. These
reactions are what make stigmatization properly understood as
burdensome. As sociologists have argued, stigmatization results in
status loss, discrimination and disadvantage, as the stigmatized
individual is both alienated and excluded from activities and
opportunities open to the non-stigmatised.11 However, it seems to
me that the core or essential burden of stigmatization, conceptually
speaking, is status loss, from which discrimination and disadvantage
flow.12
The extent to which criminal stigmatisation actually occurs as a
result of the infliction of a criminal label depends on how individuals
in different relationships to the person labelled interpret and react to
that label. The infliction of an identical criminal label on two indi-
viduals can lead to stigmatisation of one but not of another,
depending on the values of the relevant peer group and the social
status of the individual labelled. For example, positions of power
occupied by some people in society can insulate them from at least
9 Goffman, Ervin. Stigma: Notes On The Management Of Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall (1963, p. 3).
10 See Braithwaite 1989 for a justification of the criterion of dominance over other features of a
person.
11 Link and Phelan. ‘Conceptualising Stigma’, Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 2001.
12 While status loss is inherent to stigmatization, it can occur without stigmatization. Jean Hampton
puts forward a theory of retributive punishment as an infliction of status loss on the offender designed
to deny the claim to superiority implicit in the criminal act and thus to vindicate the victim’s equal
worth (Murphy and Hampton 1988, pp. 125–128). Status loss in Hampton occurs as a result of the
mastery of another, mastery that may include but is certainly not limited to the making of a status-
degrading mark.
KATERINA HADJIMATHEOU
some of the status loss and disadvantage that would be likely to
result for others similarly labelled13 while others who identify with
criminal peers may find their status thus enhanced.14 It also depends
on how public the label is, meaning in part how prominent it is to
those to whom it is visible and in part how many people the label is
visible to. Other things being equal, the greater the number of
people to whom the label is visible, the greater the number of
reactions to it, the greater the loss of status. At the same time, a label
that is impossible to ignore, like the orange boiler suits worn to carry
out community service penalties, is more likely to provoke negative
reaction than one people can choose to pretend not to have noticed.
Some legal theorists claim or imply in their writings that stigma
overlaps or is synonymous with censure, which is itself a defining
feature of punishment (coercion or ‘hard treatment’, being the
other).15 Thus John Kleinig states that ‘punishment involves a stig-
matizing condemnation of the punished…’16; and Andrew Taslitz
claims that ‘disesteem-imposition, even if not phrased quite this way,
is a clear goal of our criminal justice system. The system assumes
that conviction carries stigma with it and that the degrees of, and
actual imposition of, various sentences reflect various degrees of
disesteem.’17
This conflation of stigma and censure is problematic because it
leaves out at least two essential aspects of the former not shared by
the latter: marking out and visibility. Unlike stigmatisation, criminal
censure need not involve a process of marking out visibly.18 This fact
is concealed by talk about labelling that implies that publicity is
13 Ibid.
14 Walker, N. Punishment, Danger, and Stigma: The Morality of Criminal Justice, Oxford University
Press, 1980, pp. 102–103. Differences between the extent to which different individuals experience an
identical criminal label as stigmatising seems likely to vary relative to the extent to which: the labelled
individual identifies with the disapproving group; their sense of status is determined by their position in
relation to that group; they actually aspire to the goals in relation to whose attainment they are now at
a disadvantage.
15 Husak (2010) The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays. New York: Oxford University
Press.Ashworth and Zedner, Preventive Justice, Oxford Uni Press, 2014.
16 Kleinig, John. ‘‘The hardness of hard treatment.’’ Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory (1998) p. 273.
17 Taslitz, ‘Judging Jena’s DNA: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem’ Harvard Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties Review, 44, 2009, pp. 313, 414.
18 The question of whether stigmatization can occur without publicity was raised in a juridical
context in relation to the case of Marper, where the referral by the Chamber of the ECtHR to the
criminal stigmatization of unconvicted individuals whose DNA data was nevertheless retained by police
was challenged by the UK government, which countered that stigma could not arise in the absence of a
public articulation of suspicion (R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, ex parte LS and Marper
(2004) UKHL 94-122).
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integral to it. For example, Campbell describes criminal labelling as
involving people being ‘depicted and censured openly as criminal’
without explaining why openness or depictions should be considered
so central.19 Yet censure could – and indeed in many jurisdictions
often does – happen in closed proceedings where the official decla-
ration of criminal guilt is witnessed by very few people and where
the offender’s anonymity is guaranteed. Even in a system that, like
the UK’s, favours publicity, some categories of trials take place in
closed proceedings. This is the case, for example, with some pro-
ceedings dealing with terrorism offences, and with all proceedings in
family courts. The fact that declarations of guilt in such cases are
made in closed proceedings does not by itself render the declaration
any less condemnatory, nor necessarily any less expressive of public
disapproval (at least in the sense that ‘public’ can be taken to mean
disapproval expressed in the name of the public via legitimate
democratic mechanisms).20 In other words, unlike stigmatization,
which – other things being equal – increases with the publicity given
to a stigmatic label, censure need be no less censorious if it is
delivered in relative private.21
This should not be taken to mean that public disapproval ex-
pressed in response to criminal labelling is not censorious; only that
it is not necessary to the specific kind of censure that is itself a
defining aspect of punishment. Those who define the expression or
direction of public disapproval at an individual through criminal
censure as stigmatizing may be confusing the attitudes motivating
the imposition of criminal censure with those provoked by it. It is
the public disapproval expressed by criminalization of an act that
makes restrictions of liberty condemnatory and thus distinguishes
them from other, non-punitive restrictions. The public disapproval
that may be triggered by the criminal label imposed in response to
censure is related but distinct.
19 Campbell (2013, p. 690), my italics.
20 This stands in contrast to the claims of some theorists that, in order to achieve its aims, censure
must also be communicated to the public. For example, Ashworth and Zedner have recently claimed
that it is ‘inherent’ to the exercise of censure that it be communicated ‘to the victim (if any) and to the
public at large’ (Ashworth and Zedner 2014, p. 14).
21 There is no inconsistency between this claim and the observation, made helpfully by an
anonymous reviewer of this paper, that being censured by more people may imply more censure. This
is because the claim (and indeed the issue at hand) regards the impact on censure of its being done in
public. It does not regard the related but distinct issue of the impact on censure of greater participation
in the act of censure.
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One source of the confusion detected here may be unconscious
slippage between the censure and stigmatisation involved in the
criminalisation of an act (the result of a legislative process), and the
censure and stigmatisation involved in the criminalisation of a per-
son (the result of a judicial or quasi-judicial process). Criminalisation
marks an act out as morally condemnable, and in that sense it at-
taches stigma to that act. It is also censorious to the extent that it
directs censure towards those as-yet-unidentified individuals who
commit the criminal act. Is stigmatisation avoidable, given that
legislating to make some activity criminal invariably involves stig-
matising those who engage in it? This, former kind of stigmatisation
is not avoidable; but neither is it the kind of stigmatisation that is
potentially harmful in the ways described above. Rather, it is an
abstract kind of stigmatisation, which necessarily accompanies
criminalisation but is (theoretically at least) proportionate to the
seriousness of the crime, and is therefore unresponsive to the con-
tingent factors that determine stigmatisation (like whether or not in
practice other individuals become aware of and react negatively to
the label).
Thus far I have tried to show that neither public labelling nor
stigmatisation are essential to punishment. If this is correct, then the
question of whether labelling is justified in any particular case cannot
be determined by reference solely to the permissibility of punishing
in that case. In the following two sections, I consider the possibility
that public criminal labelling fulfils one or more of the justifying
functions of punishment and that this provides a prima facie argu-
ment in favour of it.
III. COMMUNICATIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR LABELLING-AS-PUNISHMENT
The theorists mentioned in the introduction to this paper are right to
point out that labelling as criminal someone who has not been
proven to be one is unjust. But it seems less obvious that giving
publicity to criminal labels attached to those who have been proven
guilty should be considered unproblematic. Indeed, the fact that
people convicted of crimes are not routinely required to wear badges
publicising their wrongdoing suggests that there are reasons opera-
tive in criminal justice systems that count against public criminal
labels, at least highly conspicuous ones.
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In his 1986 book, in which he lays the ground for his commu-
nicative theory of punishment, Anthony Duff considers the merits of
just this kind of labelling-as-punishment, as an alternative to incar-
ceration or other forms of hard treatment.22 He suggests that the
reasons ‘symbolic’23 forms of punishment, such as criminal badges,
are not considered appropriate by either consequentialist or
retributivist theories, relate to the inevitable inconsistency and
arbitrariness with which the public will express their disapproval of
those labels means ‘they will not distribute punishments equitably,
or ensure that offenders receive the kind and degree of punishment
they deserve’.24 However, he implies, if the problem of propor-
tionality and coordination could be resolved, then public criminal
labelling as punishment has many advantages from a communicative
perspective.
Duff’s suggestions about the potential costs and benefits of public
criminal labelling as punishment are worth contemplating, because
they invite us to think about labelling in isolation from the other,
formal restrictions it often accompanies. Doing so helps to fix
attention on the rationale for and reasons against labelling as pun-
ishment. And, as I will argue below, these reasons apply, albeit to
varying degrees, to contemporary criminal labelling practices too.
If Duff is correct to claim that conspicuous criminal labelling
would fulfil effectively the communicative function of punishment,
and that its only downside would be potential disproportionality,
then perhaps the arguments in its favour are stronger than he thinks.
After all, disproportionality is a problem that arises in connection
with all kinds of punishments.25 And the communication of censure
is acknowledged as an important, if not vital function of punishment,
even by those who reject claims that communication can be a
complete theory of punishment.26 If we can preserve the commu-
nicative potential of public labelling while reducing the risk of dis-
22 Duff, Trials and Punishments, London: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
23 While Duff and others refer to this kind of public criminal labelling as a purely ‘symbolic’ penalty,
thus implying that there is no hard treatment involved (and therefore none that must be justified), this
is misleading. The state’s actions in labelling people publicly amount to hard treatment, because forcing
people to wear badges is a form of coercion.
24 Duff (1986, p. 149).
25 Ryberg, J. The Ethics of Proportionate Punishment: A Critical Investigation. Kluwer (2004); Kolber
‘Unintentional punishment’ Legal Theory, 18 (2012).
26 Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press,
(2011), p. 91.
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proportionality, then we may appear to have a strong case for the
justice of labelling-as-punishment.
I think that such a case is in fact difficult to make, and in this
section I explain why. I begin by acknowledging the communicative
potential of conspicuous criminal labelling as punishment. Then I
put forward some reasons for thinking that it is unlikely ever to be
realised in practice and argue that this would continue to be true
even in a society in which most people subscribe to Duff’s com-
municative theory of punishment. Specifically, I argue that public
criminal labelling is stigmatising in ways that frustrate the kind of
communication justified by Duff’s theory. In addition, as Duff and
others note, it leads to inevitable disproportionality. I argue that the
disproportionality it leads to is indicative of unfairness and discrim-
ination towards those thus criminalised amongst other things. I
suggest that both of those problems arise primarily because con-
spicuous criminal labelling inverts the norm common to – dare I say
defining of – liberal societies, that punishment is something that
should be carried out by the state on behalf of citizens, and not vice
versa.27
IV. COMMUNICATIVE THEORY AND THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC
CRIMINAL LABELLING AS PUNISHMENT
Let us begin by describing what has become known as the com-
municative function of punishment. The communicative account of
punishment states, roughly, that the primary aim of punishment
should be to communicate public disapproval of the crime to the
offender in such a way as to persuade them, by appeal to moral
reasons, to repent.28 According to communicative theory, both
censure and hard treatment communicate disapproval and hard
treatment is also a means by which offenders can do penance and
repent, in something like a performance of contrition. On the
27 This norm is most obviously derivable from John Locke and Robert Nozick’s individualist lib-
eralism, in which the move from a state of nature to organized society involves individuals delegating
their natural right to punish to the state (Locke 1689, pp. 128–130; Nozick 1974, p. 112). In contrast,
Duff’s communitarianism conceptualizes the right to punish as an entitlement not of individuals but of
the community. Nevertheless, both theories assert that punishment for crimes is a right exercised via
the legitimate institutions of the state. And both deny that citizens, collectively or as individuals, retain a
right to punish that can be exercised independently of the punishing acts of the legitimate institutions of
the state (Duff 2013).
28 Duff (2001, pp. 81–82).
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communicative account, punishment is owed both to the victims of
the crime and to the perpetrator, and thus punishment is a duty and
not only a right. The communicative account is retributive and thus
requires that some measure of proportionality be maintained be-
tween the seriousness of the crime committed and the severity of the
penalty.29
Let us turn now to consider the communicative benefits of public
criminal labelling. Duff’s argument in favour of labelling-as-punish-
ment via criminal badges is that, by inflicting ‘a public
and . . . lasting reminder of the offender’s guilt’ it can make
offenders ‘face up to’ and take responsibility for what they have
done, which is an essential step towards repentance.30 It does indeed
seem hard to dispute that being forced to reveal one’s crimes to
every person one comes into physical contact with would make it
difficult to ignore them. The prominence given to the criminal label
over other facts about oneself would also likely force one to take
seriously and reflect on one’s crimes, as would being faced con-
stantly with (presumably overwhelmingly negative) public reactions
to those crimes. The fact that it would remain the responsibility of
the individual offender, rather than a punishing authority, to
undertake reformative actions, coupled with the natural desire to
demonstrate that one has taken appropriate such actions and
therefore is deserving of forgiveness and redemption (e.g. by stating
‘I have stopped taking drugs and here are the results of my last blood
test’; ‘I have taken an anger management course and here is the copy
of my certificate’) may also encourage individuals to take responsi-
bility for the state of their own moral compass.
Though Duff does not himself argue thus, we can add in support
of his claims that the infliction of criminal badges might further
contribute to the communicative aims of punishment by enabling a
better fit between crime and punishment than the inevitably stan-
dardised penalties devised by the state: Unlike those penalties, the
powers of human expression enable reactions that are infinitely
subtle and true to people’s attitudes about a particular act of
wrongdoing. In practice, these attitudes shift over time with changes
in public morality. One source of poor fit between standardised
29 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, (2001), p.187; von Hirsch Censure and Sanctions,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, chap. 2.
30 Duff (1986, p. 148).
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penalties and crimes stems from the weak responsiveness of the
former to changes in attitudes towards the latter. If one of the
fundamental aims of punishment must be to express public disap-
proval for wrongdoing, if the justification and moral authority of a
specific punishment is drawn from its effectiveness in expressing that
disapproval, then who could be better placed to deliver it in a way
that reflects the nature and extent of that disapproval but the public
itself? And what better opportunity to express remorse and
demonstrate a commitment to reform than face-to-face with the
community whose norms one has flouted? Thus it might be argued
that criminal badges fulfil communicative aims of punishment in a
way that is both more faithful to those aims and maintains a better fit
between crime and punishment better than current, state-mediated
alternatives.
V. LIMITATIONS OF LABELLING-AS-PUNISHMENT FOR THE
COMMUNICATIVE THEORY
While the potential of conspicuous labelling to facilitate communi-
cation of disapproval, rational persuasion and repentance is power-
ful, there are at least two sets of reasons why we should be sceptical
that this potential could ever be realised in practice. The first relates
to the fact most people do not share the view that just punishment
means the communication of censure in the form of rational per-
suasion and this means that their reactions to criminal labels are
unlikely to be in the communicative spirit. The second relates to the
nature of the relationship between offenders and individuals qua
citizens, a relationship that I argue is not a sound basis for effective
intervention of the communicative kind. Taken together, these
reasons make it inevitable in practice that conspicuous labelling will
facilitate public reactions to criminality that both undermine the
communicative function of punishment and are unfair to those la-
belled.
VI. THE WRONG KIND OF REACTION TO CRIMINALITY
In most contemporary societies not everyone shares the view that
punishment means rational appeal to moral reasons. What is more,
in most liberal, multicultural societies, people’s views about what
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just punishment consists in diverge significantly, such that people
compelled to wear criminal badges would be likely to receive a
variety of responses to their criminality, of which some aim to
persuade, while others aim to deter, incapacitate, or even harm. Fear
of abuse or even retaliatory attacks by members of the public would,
especially for those convicted of offences considered deeply shame-
ful, be well-grounded. Recorded incidents of violence against sex
offenders in the USA suggest this would in some places be a very real
concern.31 So too do reports in the UK about the treatment of
offenders wearing high-visibility ‘community payback’ vests while
doing community service. These chronicle offenders being shot,
beaten32 and verbally abused, prompting protests by probation
officers and a refusal by some organisations offering offender work
placements to use the vests.33
Positive reports of public responses to conspicuous criminal labels
are not impossible to find. One notable instance involves the case of
Michael Hubacek, convicted in the USA of manslaughter for a drink
driving accident. Hubacek only served six months of the ten-year
prison sentence he was originally given. One condition of his pro-
bation was to wear a placard once a month outside a high school
stating ‘I KILLED TWO PEOPLE WHILE DRUNK DRIVING’ (thus
in this unusual case, the public labelling was not built into the
punishment via prior legislation, as it is with the high-visibility
clothing for community sentences in the UK, but rather the sen-
tencing judge used their discretion to devise a punishment based
explicitly on labelling). Hubacek reports feeling positive about his
labelling, to which he says ‘90%’ of people’ reacted kindly, saying
things such as ‘God bless you’ and ‘Things will be okay’.34 It is
reassuring to know that public criminal labelling can prompt com-
passion as well as abuse. But compassion is not the same as the
rational persuasion by appeal to moral reasons required by the
communicative theory. And, as we can see from the religious tone of
31 See for example attacks on sex offenders whose personal details made public under Megan’s Law
in the USA reported in Levenson et al., ‘Megan’s law and its impact on community re-entry for sex
offenders’ Behavioural Sciences and the Law, 25(4) 2007.
32 ‘High-visibility offenders face reprisal attacks, union warns’ by Alan Travis, in The Guardian
Newspaper, Friday 22 Nov, 2008. At: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/nov/28/community-
payback-high-visibility-vests.
33 Harry Fletcher, ‘NAPO warning on high visibility vests’ Napo News 206. February 2009.
34 Ronson, J. So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed. Picador: London, (2015), p. 83.
KATERINA HADJIMATHEOU
one of the comments received by Hubacek, even messages of
compassion will inevitably draw on members’ of the public’s own
personal conceptions of the good. Unless people communicate using
appeals to humanity or other high-level values shared by people with
a range of backgrounds, it is likely that it will be articulated in terms
that the offender cannot reasonably expect to share, and thus fail to
resonate with that person. Having said that, if we expect people to
engage in good faith with offenders, it seems unreasonable to expect
them to refrain from putting forth reasons that are genuinely their
own. There seems to be a tension between the desirability of the
personal element for effective communication and the desirability of
a more neutral, democratic perspective from which to censure.
I think this tension arises because in Duff’s example, citizens are
given what he calls a ‘civic’ duty to punish, yet without being made
democratically accountable for their punishing actions. This notion
of a civic duty to punish blurs the line between interpersonal duties
we owe each other as members of society and the democratically-
assigned duties of those who carry out punishing functions on behalf
of citizens. This blurring is problematic because it risks lending
democratic authority to – and encouraging people to feel self-righ-
teous in the expression of – their own personal reactions to crimi-
nality, whatever these might be. In most current penal systems,
those who assign, and implement criminal punishments are subject
to scrutiny by democratic institutions such as parliament, specialist
oversight bodies, and the media. This aims to reduce the risk that the
punishments that people suffer in the name of society are unfairly
imposed or inflicted in ways that fail to align with the norms of
society.35 In addition, expressing to offenders one’s personal disgust
with criminality is not permitted while one is acting as a restorative
justice officer, because doing so conflicts with the aims of the job.
This prescriptiveness with respect to reactions to criminality is per-
mitted because the aim of the job is to help reform offenders, not
shame them, and the officer volunteered to do it. The same cannot
be said for individual citizens acting in their personal capacity, for
whom prescriptiveness of this sort would be an unacceptable inter-
ference with freedom of expression. In sum, as long as people are
invited to react to criminality wherever they see it they will some-
35 Owen Fiss expressed worries similar to these in relation to a legal movement in 1980s USA to
encourage the use of private settlements as an alternative to court hearings, see Fiss (1984, p. 1085).
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times react in ways that either fail to promote or actively undermine
the aims of punishment as communication. Giving them a special
right to do so risks encouraging these reactions to be made more
stridently and even less helpfully.
A further problem would arise from people’s non-punitive reac-
tions to criminal labels. On a communicative account, explicitly
punitive reactions would include people’s verbal expression of dis-
approval as well as disapproval expressed through some action such
as the temporary suspension of a contract of employment. Non-
punitive reactions to label may occur when, faced with evidence of
an individual’s criminality that is impossible to ignore, yet without
intending to punish, people exercise their freedom of association in
ways that deny that individual social benefits and exclude them from
social activities in ways that are seriously detrimental to them. While
I might choose to associate with someone whose criminal history I
do not know, and while I might assert and indeed believe that such
history would be irrelevant to my choices of association, I might find
it difficult to continue in my association if that history were shoved
in my face, as it were. My decision to discontinue the association
might stem more from embarrassment and awkwardness or fear of
what others might think than a desire to punish, but it would nev-
ertheless cause suffering to the labelled individual. Suffering that is
multiplied many times over as others react in similar ways.
Before we consider whether this suffering can be either justified
or tolerated as an unfortunate by-product of just punishment, let us
consider the observation that the fact that actions such as these lack
punitive intent means they cannot be conceptualized, nor indeed
justified, as punishment.36 As Dan Markel has pointed out, acts taken
in response to crime convey a message, but are not properly
understood as retributive unless that message is intelligible to the
offender.37 In relation to the current discussion, being avoided, ex-
cluded, or shunned, even ruefully, carries a message of public dis-
approval – a message that what one did makes one an undesirable
36 Markel, D., and Flanders, C. ‘Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive
Justice’ California Law Review 98, 2010. Punitive intent is part of the definition of punishment according
to Hart and others. See H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 60(1), 1959. David Gray claims, for example, that ‘‘no theory of criminal punishment
is obliged to justify… the unintended suffering that may incidentally result from punishment.’’ Gray,
‘Punishment as suffering’ Vanderbilt Law Review, 63, 2010, p. 54.
37 Markel, D. ‘Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?’ 54 Vanderbilt Law Review, 2001, p.
2195.
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associate. But unless the motivations for such action are clearly
signposted (as they are during court proceedings, especially sen-
tencing) there is little difference, from the offender’s perspective,
between an act of exclusion driven by a desire to punish and that
driven by squeamishness. As others have pointed out, this need not
be taken to mean that such actions can be disregarded or discounted
by theorists of punishment. Even if we were to concede that this
kind of collateral harm to the offender should carry no weight on the
retributive scales, and therefore may not, strictly speaking, be an
issue of punitive proportionality, it must surely carry some weight in
the broader criminal justice decision-making process.38 In particular,
unless it can be outweighed, the extra suffering caused by non-
punitive reactions to labels can be a legitimate reason for eschewing
labelling-as-punishment in favour of another form of punishment
with less weighty and inevitable collateral harms, assuming such a
punishment can be found.
This extra suffering is difficult to reconcile with the communicative
aims of punishment, because it actively undermines them by isolating
the offender from the moral community. The inevitable shrinking
away from people bearing the criminal mark is by itself sufficient to
isolate individuals. But fear of the public reaction to one’s criminality is
also a powerful incentive to withdraw voluntarily from social inter-
action and/or to seek the company of those more favourably disposed
to criminality. And while the removal of a criminal label could be an
opportunity to celebrate reconciliation and open the door to reinte-
gration, by then the process of exclusion and withdrawal is likely to
have raised significant and lasting barriers to these aims.
VII. UNFAIRNESS AND DISPROPORTIONALITY
In addition to failing to bring about the kind of communication that
is justified on labelling-as-punishment is unfair to offenders. People
considering whether to commit criminal acts should know in ad-
vance what their punishments if caught will consist in, roughly
speaking. Otherwise their decision about whether to commit the
crime cannot be said to be properly informed, or, it follows, au-
tonomously taken. The unpredictability of public responses to
38 Gray, Ibid. p.1630 n46.
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criminal labels makes them unfair as a form of punishment for at
least this reason.
A further reason why unfairness would arise is that inequalities of
status would come to determine those responses, thus making
proportionality difficult to achieve. The concern here is that people
who are equally culpable of equally serious crimes would be pun-
ished more or less severely because of the unequal and stratified
character of most modern societies. People’s moral judgements of
and reactions to others are influenced by the social status and other
attributes of those judged. For example, research shows that people’s
preconceptions and personal prejudices come often to influence their
performance as jurors, and that juror bias is difficult to address,
either by raising jurors’ own awareness of it or via pre-appointment
vetting schemes.39 There is no reason to believe that bias would be
any less likely to influence the reactions to criminals of the general
public. There is a real risk that, in our imperfect societies, the
identity of the criminal rather than the nature of the crime would
too often come to determine extent the nature and severity of
punishment. Such a situation sits uncomfortably with well-estab-
lished and widely-held intuitions about fairness and desert, in par-
ticular the intuition that when people should be punished they
should be punished for what they do rather than who they are.
Earlier, I mentioned that the problem of disproportionality is one
suffered by all theories of punishment. But the disproportionality just
described is harder to justify or tolerate than the disproportionality
that results from imposing an identical penalty on two individuals
who turn out to react to it in different ways. Standardisation in
criminal penalties is an attempt by legislators to prevent bias influ-
encing sentencing; to subject sentencing to democratic oversight;
and to make both potential offenders and potential victims aware of
the kinds of punishment that can be expected for specific crimes. The
fact that, despite these efforts, some people will suffer more from a
specific punishment than others is unfortunate, but no one is thereby
wronged. In contrast, people are wronged when they suffer pun-
ishments that are determined even in part by personal prejudices
towards them.
39 Roberts, A, ‘(Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias’, Connecticut
Law Review 44(3), 2012.
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The problems with conspicuous labelling that I have just pointed
to are not problems internal to the communicative theory. Rather,
they are problems that arise mainly because not enough people
actually subscribe to the communicative theory. If most people
genuinely did subscribe to that theory, then the uncertainty faced by
the offender, the risk and fear of insult or abuse, the parallel trepi-
dation felt by members of the public, the resulting disproportionality
and the tendency of labelling to marginalise rather than reintegrate
the offender would either disappear or be reduced significantly. If
this were to occur, would conspicuous criminal labelling serve well
enough the communicative aims of punishment, so as to make it
justified? As I will now argue, there are compelling reasons to think
not.
It is pertinent to recall here that the aim of communication is to
engage the offender in moral reflection and rational persuasion that
will help them recognise the wrongness of their actions, repent, and
seek a reconciliation with the society whose norms they have
transgressed. The effectiveness of any such communication ventured
by a citizen is likely to depend to some extent on their knowledge
both of the particular case and of the individual in question. Without
sufficient knowledge of the case, it would be all too easy for people
to censure inappropriately. The detail presented at trial proceedings
serves not only to promote fair verdicts but also to inform sen-
tencing. It is hard to see how sufficient detail could be made available
to the public to enable them to respond appropriately to a criminal
badge.
But even if this problem were surmountable, it still seems un-
likely that ordinary strangers will provide reliably the right responses
to criminality. Duff speaks of ‘civic duties’ to censure. This seems to
assume that ‘citizens’ as such stand in the kind of relationship to each
other that makes effective communication leading to moral reform a
possibility. Yet empirically-informed arguments suggest that moral-
ising about crime is best left to those close to the offender both in
personal relationship and in terms of peer group.40 This is not only
because those who know and can relate to the individual are, gen-
erally speaking, better able put their crimes in context and thus to
intervene in ways more likely to resonate with offenders, but also
40 Braithwaite, J. Crime, Shame, and Reintegration. Cambridge University Press, 1989.
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because offenders are more likely to respond to those they consider
peers, allies or close associates, whose opinion they care about and
whose acceptance and approval they are motivated to secure.41
Somewhat paradoxically, those close enough to an offender to en-
gage in the right kind of communication with them would not
typically need labels to find out about their criminality. The label is
for everyone else. Yet it is ‘everyone else’ who is least well-placed to
communicate censure in the right way.
Even if it were possible to give citizens instantaneous detailed
knowledge of those labelled and the crimes they have committed,
asserting a universal civic duty to punish seems excessively bur-
densome. For many of us, faced with the presence of individuals
guilty of serious crimes, it would require significant effort merely to
control one’s emotional reactions to the label, to ‘keep calm and
carry on’, let alone to engage the individual concerned in rational
persuasion to reform. People may understandably fear those with a
history of violent crime or abusive behaviour, especially as they
would not know how such individuals might react to public censure.
Indeed it would be difficult to know how to react even to less
disturbing breaches of the law, because partly because of the
inevitable awkwardness that would come from engaging strangers or
people we hardly know in discussion that is deeply personal, con-
cerning as it does the state of their moral conscience. It seems
unreasonable to insist that people nevertheless must engage directly
with such individuals on the subject of their crimes. Yet making such
engagement an imperfect duty (i.e. something we must sometimes
do and to some extent but not necessarily in every possible case to
the fullest extent possible42) risks entrusting punishment for some
very difficult crimes to the eager few, who may have additional,
extraneous motivations for helping individuals to reform.43
41 This need not contradict claims made on p.13 above about the advantages of leaving censure to
an authority that is accountable democratically, such as the judiciary, for two reasons. First, because the
judiciary will typically have been given a great deal of information about both the specific incidents
under consideration and the individual accused, and so will still be better placed than ‘citizens’ to deliver
appropriate censure. Second, because the fact that a criminal’s peers might be best placed to deliver
effective censure does not mean that they will generally be motivated to do so such that they could be
relied upon to fulfill the function of a punishing authority.
42 For an account of Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties see Hill, Thomas E.,
Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory. Ithaca: Cornell U.P (1992).
43 It is not difficult to imagine some religious groups seizing the opportunity presented by a badging
system to acquire new souls and coming to dominate the field of censure.
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Even if people were not required to respond punitively to
knowledge of criminality, the mere fact that such knowledge is
forced upon them creates a de-facto requirement to know, and this
by itself seems problematic, at least for those amongst us who would
genuinely prefer not to know. Why might some people reasonably
prefer not to be alerted to the criminality of others? One reason
might be that giving criminality such prominence in public risks
destabilising widely valued conventions of concealment that consti-
tute what Thomas Nagel has called ‘one of the conditions of civili-
sation’.44 Non-exposure of criminal history in everyday interpersonal
interactions, combined with the knowledge that criminal justice is
being done elsewhere, on our behalf, helps to maintain the kind of
civilised atmosphere that enables people to go about their business
with others in an ordered and peaceful manner. The prominence of a
criminal badge would make an individual’s criminal history impos-
sible to conceal or ignore. Imagine being regularly faced in one’s
daily interactions at the supermarket, on public transport, at the park
with one’s children – with murderers, rapists, child abusers, wife-
beaters, terrorists, robbers, pimps, drug dealers, thieves and dan-
gerous drivers. Of course, we are all faced regularly with such people
today, but the fact that we – generally speaking – don’t know who
among us they are, enables civilised interaction to take place.45
Both the issue of overdemandingness and the previous concern
about people’s natural awkwardness and/or fear might be addressed
by producing a script, which both offender and censurer could learn
and recite, in a kind of ritual of censure and repentance. This could
alleviate some of the uncertainty and fear on both sides and facilitate
communication. But ritualistic exchanges can all too often become
mechanical and easy to enact without genuine personal conviction.
Even an optional script risks substituting meaningful communication
with empty phrases.
To sum up, in this section I have argued that public criminal
labelling as punishment is difficult to justify on communicative
grounds, even in a society in which most people were genuinely
44 Nagel, ‘Concealment and Exposure’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27(1), 1998, p. 3.
45 ‘The point of polite formulae and broad abstentions from expression is to leave a great range of
potentially disruptive material unacknowledged and therefore out of play.’ Nagel, Ibid. p. 1. Here Nagel
is discussing social conventions of privacy, but his points are relevant to people’s criminal histories and
judged propensities.
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committed to the communicative account of punishment. The rea-
sons for this, which include concerns about unfairness, dispropor-
tionality, and the challenges to effective communication faced by
even well-meaning individuals, all stem from the fact that labelling-
as-punishment transfers some of the right and duty to punish from
authoritative institutions to citizens. Such a move seems to hold
most potential if implemented in small, tight-knit, morally
homogenous communities. In such communities, people already
know each other well, which means that awkwardness and fear are
reduced and crimes can be put into context. People who abuse their
right to punish are easier to hold accountable morally for abusive
censure, as this is likely to be witnessed by associates. But it seems
unlikely to be successful in mass societies populated by disconnected
and sometimes mutually suspicious groups and individuals that often
do not relate to each other. Against this background, any faith in
‘citizens’ as such to take on this reformative role seems misplaced.
An alternative is presented by current efforts in the field of
restorative justice, which aim to connect offenders with specially
trained professionals and therapists who can broker such commu-
nication and engagement as well as guide and nurture it once it is in
place. But restorative efforts do not involve labelling individuals or
publicising their criminality to society in general.
Towards the beginning of this paper, I wrote that the consider-
ations put forward in relation to Duff’s idea of criminal badging can
help us to think more clearly about the potential for contemporary
criminal labelling practices to be justified as punishment. But, it
might be argued, all the points I have made thus far against the view
that labelling may be justified as punishment on communicative
grounds – points about the likely disproportionality, excessive de-
mands on individuals to communicate disapproval, barriers to rec-
onciliation and reintegration, and unfairness – have all been
discussed in relation to criminal labels that are used in place of other
kinds of punishment; that attach physically to the offender, like
clothing or a badge; and that are therefore extremely conspicuous in a
way that makes them both dominant in relation to other charac-
teristics of the offender and very difficult for others to ignore. Many
contemporary criminal labelling practices do not involve such con-
spicuous marking out, many are limited to a certain place and time,
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and most take place alongside other, formal sanctions, such as
community service.
It is true that the stigmatising potential of mugshots on posters,
high-visibility work vests, or mentions on a police-hosted website or in
the local paper pales in comparison to that promised by criminal
badges. But this gives us no reason to think they are any easier to justify
as punishment on communicative grounds.46 And in any case, current
differences between readily available criminal labels, such as listings in
online databases or on police websites, and highly conspicuous labels
such as Duff’s criminal badges may shrink and even disappear as
technological developments collate and present information about
people to us automatically. For example, it is not far-fetched to imagine
that at some point in the near future many people will use connected
wearable devices equipped with powerful facial recognition technol-
ogy that could be set to automatically provide summaries of online
information about everyone the wearer comes across, in real time. If
that occurs, then criminal labels that can currently be revealed by an
Internet search will become far more conspicuous.47
VIII. PUBLIC CRIMINAL LABELLING AS A DETERRENT TO CRIME
But perhaps the justification for labelling-as-added punishment is to be
found in its deterrence or crime-reduction function, rather than its
potential as a means of communication. It is often taken to be obvi-
ously true that the prospect of the publicity of criminalisation induces
fear and shame and thereby deters would-be criminals.48 As Hart ob-
served: ‘[A constitution maker] will be likely to regard the desire of the
ordinary man to avoid the moral condemnation of his commu-
nity . . . as a powerful factor influencing human behavior which can
scarcely with safety be dispensed with.’49 And deterrence has in prac-
ticemotivated the use of criminal labels by police to publicly name and
shame offenders. For example, deterrence both of offenders and
46 As far as I am aware, Duff himself does not attempt to justify such actual examples of public
labelling on punitive grounds. Where he does defend publicity in criminal justice, this is primarily in
terms of the importance of public participation in criminal justice processes, though considerations of
transparency and deterrence are also given weight (Duff 1991, p. 148).
47 Tunick, ‘Privacy and Punishment’, Social Theory and Practice, 39(4), 2013: 643–668.
48 Arneson, R. ‘Shame, stigma and disgust in the decent society’, Journal of Ethics, 2007; Kahan DM
(2006) ‘What’s really wrong with shaming sanctions’ Texas Law Review 84(7), pp. 2075–2097.
49 Hart, HM. ‘The aims of the criminal law’, Law and Contemporary Problems, 23(3), 1958: 401–441, p.
409.
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would-be offenders accounted for three of the four objectives listed by
Essex police in support of their proposed offender-naming scheme,
under which they planned to display posters bearing a photograph of a
selected offender, their name, the nature of their offence, the sentence
and the words ‘If you come to Brentwood to commit crime, expect to
do the time’.50 The question ofwhether public criminal labelling deters
is an empirical one and in this section I draw attention to some recent
research on the topic that suggests this approach to justifying labelling
as punishment is unpromising.
Labelling theory is a strand of criminological research that anal-
yses the impact on recidivism and delinquency of criminal labelling.
Labelling theorists typically define labelling as the application of a
public criminal record. In a 2007 paper, Chiricos et al. examined, in a
US context, the relative impact on recidivism of felony convictions
that are accompanied by a publicly accessible criminal record and
those in which the judge restricts the publicity of the record. Indi-
viduals whose conviction did not result in criminal labelling lost no
civil rights (to vote etc.) and could legitimately fail to declare the
conviction on employment applications and elsewhere. Analysis of
reconviction data for 95,919 men and women supported the con-
clusion that those formally labelled are significantly more likely to
reoffend in two years than those who are not.51 Longitudinal studies
have produced similar findings.52
The explanations given for how and why labelling increases
recidivism centre on the difficulty of desisting from crime when, as
for example is often the case in the USA and Europe, one’s criminal
label prevents or obstructs one finding a decent job.53 In the USA, it
can also prevent one renting accommodation, or qualifying for loans
or housing assistance.54 As Jacobs puts it ‘[t]he criminal justice sys-
50 See Ellis v. The Chief Constable of Essex Police [2003], EWHC 1321.
51 Chiricos, Barrick, Bales and Bontrager, ‘The labeling of convicted felons and its consequences for
recidivism’, Criminology, 45(3), 2007.
52 Bernburg, Krohn & Rivera ‘Official labelling, criminal embeddedness, and subsequent delin-
quency: a longitudinal test of labelling theory’ in Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 43(1), 2006:
pp. 67-88.
53 Criminal record data is made available to employers in the UK and EU countries and those with a
criminal record are in many countries barred from a wide range of public sector and licensed positions.
(Larrauri-Pijoan 2014).
54 Pager, D.Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration University of Chiese
Press, 2009; Vallas and Dietrich, ‘Minor crimes should not lead to a life-sentence’, Newsweek, 12/3/14;
Maruna, S. ‘Judicial Rehabilitation and the ‘Clean Bill of Health’ in Criminal Justice’, European Journal of
Probation, 3(1), (2011): 97–117.
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tem feeds on itself. The more people who are arrested, prosecuted,
convicted and especially incarcerated, the larger is the criminally
stigmatized underclass screened out of legitimate opportunities’.55 If
this is correct, then it is likely that limiting the application of criminal
labels reduces both the harms of stigmatisation to offenders and the
harm to society of increased crime. There are also of course reasons
of social justice to avoid measures that contribute to the creation of
an entrenched underclass, of any sort.
While the results of these studies are fascinating, there are limi-
tations to their weight as evidence for the claim that labelling as
added punishment does not have significant crime-reduction effects,
via deterrence. These stem from two features of the research. The
first is that it compares rates of recidivism for offenders who have
been incarcerated and labelled with those for offenders who have
been neither incarcerated nor labelled. That makes it difficult to
isolate the effects of labelling from the effects of incarceration. This is
a real challenge, given that a range of studies appear to show that
longer periods of incarceration are correlated with higher rates of
recidivism.56
The second is that it does not attempt to measure deterrence as
such, just recidivism, which is only one aspect of deterrence. This is
not a problem if the ultimate aim of deterrence is to reduce the
overall number of crimes committed. Most crimes are committed by
the same people; therefore if a measure reduces recidivism by
deterring offenders, it will reduce overall crime significantly. But if
the aim of deterrence is both to reduce the overall number of crimes
and to reduce the overall number of people criminalised, then
deterrence measures should be targeted towards those who would
otherwise commit crime as well as those who already have com-
mitted a crime. Because it only reports rates of recidivism, the re-
search cited above cannot tell us whether labelling criminals deters
would-be criminals.
Despite these caveats, the research does suggest a positive impact
on recidivism of labelling that is difficult to discount. In the light of
55 Jacobs, J. Mass incarceration and the proliferation of criminal records’ in University of St Thomas
Law Journal 3(3), 2006: 387.
56 Cullen, F and Jonson C, ‘Labelling Theory and Correctional Rehabilitation: Beyond Unanticipated
Consequences’ in Labelling Theory: Empirical Tests, Farrington and Murray (Eds.) New Jersey: Trans-
action, (2014).
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this, any attempt to justify public labelling of criminals in terms of
deterrence would need to indicate convincingly that it reduced first-
time offending by more than it aggravated recidivism. This has yet to
be done. What all this suggests is that if punishment is justified in
virtue of its deterrence or crime-reduction effects, then adding public
criminal labelling to other sanctions is unlikely to be justified as
punishment. This conclusion is relevant both to the discretionary
labelling intentionally inflicted by judges (as in the case of the
sandwich-board wearing Hubacek) and to that legislated by elected
representatives deciding whether public labelling should feature in or
accompany any new or existing punishments on the books.
IX. CONCLUSION
Towards the start of this paper I indicated that one of the motiva-
tions for writing it was to interrogate the claim that labelling is an
appropriate response to a criminal conviction, but a violation of the
presumption of innocence in the absence of such a conviction. The
arguments put forward here should not be taken to suggest that
criminal guilt or innocence makes no difference to the wrongness of
inflicting a criminal label. On the contrary, when an innocent person
is labeled a criminal they are wronged severely and their rights are
violated, because the mere fact of their being labeled undeservingly
is an injustice, prior to any consideration of the proportionality or
fairness of the publicity given to the label. Being labeled inaccurately
as a criminal is insulting and it is a violation of the presumption of
innocence. It also exposes the individual in question to the risk of
undeserved harms resulting from criminal stigmatization. But la-
belling an innocent individual as a criminal is wrong in principle and
not only in virtue of such potential harms.
In contrast, labelling an individual accurately as criminal is neither
insulting nor a violation of their presumption of innocence, nor
indeed is it unjustified in principle. Rather, nothing that has been
argued here rules out the possibility that (good enough) evidence of
criminality makes the act of labelling morally permissible. But the
inevitable stigmatizing effects of public labelling make a robust jus-
tification necessary. If what has been argued here is convincing, then
such a justification cannot be constructed by appeal to either the
communicative or the deterrence functions of punishment.
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